Commodity supercycles are rare, seismic shifts in global economics—periods when surging demand and constrained supply drive prices upward for years or even decades.
For Africa, these cycles have too often been stories of missed opportunities, leaving behind mismanaged wealth, environmental degradation, and entrenched poverty.
Yet today, as the world enters a new supercycle fueled by the energy transition, geopolitical realignments, and Europe’s urgent rearmament, Africastands at a historic crossroads.
For Rwanda, this presents a historic opportunity. The last cycle peaked in 2011, marking the best decade in commodity market history. 2025 marks the beginning of that similar cycle all over again.
So far, no one knows how long this cycle will last, but if recent history serves us well, it should be at least a decade.
With untapped deposits of lithium, tantalum, tungsten, and rare earths—minerals critical to batteries, semiconductors, and advanced weaponry—Rwanda has a generational chance to rewrite Africa’s narrative of resource mismanagement.
The stakes are nothing less than transforming an estimated $5 billion in annual mineral potential into lasting prosperity for its 13 million people.
But to seize this moment, policymakers must act decisively, learning from the failures of neighbors while capitalizing on Rwanda’s unique advantages: stability, governance, and strategic vision.
Consider the cautionary tales etched across Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which holds over 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves, produced 130,000 metric tons of the mineral in 2022—enough to power half of the globe’s electric vehicle batteries.
Yet the sector contributes a meager 3.4% to the DRC’s GDP. Most of its cobalt is exported raw to China, where it is refined into battery-grade materials, capturing 80% of the value chain. Meanwhile, 73% of Congolese live on less than $1.90 a day.
The DRC’s inability to build domestic refining capacity, compounded by corruption and conflict, has left its people destitute in a land of mineral plenty.
Angola, Africa’s second-largest oil producer, offers another sobering lesson. Between 2004 and 2014, as oil prices soared from $30 to $110 per barrel, Angola’s economy grew at an average of 8.3% annually.
But instead of diversifying, the country doubled down on oil, which still accounts for 90% of exports and 70% of tax revenue.
When prices crashed in 2014, GDP contracted by 3.7% in 2016, inflation hit 41%, and debt ballooned to 120% of GDP.
Today, nearly half of Angolans live in poverty, trapped in a boom-bust cycle they did not create.
Zambia, Africa’s second-largest copper producer, fared no better. Copper accounts for 70% of its export earnings, yet when prices collapsed from $10,000 per ton in 2011 to $4,500 in 2016, the economy imploded.
Debt surged to 104% of GDP by 2021, leading to a default. Despite producing 850,000 tons of copper annually, Zambia’s mining sector employs fewer than 90,000 people in a nation of 20 million.
The absence of value-added industries—copper wiring factories, battery component plants—has left the country perpetually vulnerable.
These stories reveal a pattern: African nations extract resources but fail to industrialize, profit from price spikes but collapse during downturns, and enrich foreign corporations while impoverishing citizens.
The World Bank estimates that African countries capture only 15–25% of the total value generated by their minerals.
Rwanda, however, has the tools to break this cycle. To leverage the new supercycle, Rwanda must act on three fronts: dominate the mineral value chain, diversify its economy, and cement its reputation as a stable, ethical partner in an unstable world.
The global forces driving this supercycle are unprecedented. The energy transition alone requires staggering mineral inputs: lithium demand is projected to grow 40-fold by 2040, cobalt demand 20-fold, and copper demand will double to 50 million tons annually.
Geopolitics adds fuel to the fire. The U.S. and EU, desperate to break China’s dominance (Beijing controls 80% of Africa’s mining projects), have launched initiatives like the Minerals Security Partnership to secure alternative supplies.
Meanwhile, a decade of underinvestment in mining—global exploration spending fell 60% between 2012 and 2020—has left supplies constrained just as demand explodes. For Rwanda, this convergence is transformative.
Lithium prices, which soared from $6,000 per ton in 2020 to $78,000 in 2022 before stabilizing at $25,000 in 2023, could anchor a thriving battery industry. Tantalum, critical for smartphones and defense systems, trades at $158 per kilogram, up 27% since 2020.
Yet today, mining contributes just 1.4% to Rwanda’s GDP. With strategic action, this figure could reach more than 10% by 2030, generating billions in revenue and tens of thousands of jobs.
A new dimension has now emerged: Europe’s pivot to military Keynesianism. Germany, the EU’s economic engine, recently exempted defense spending from its strict fiscal rules, signaling a surge in rearmament investments.
Defense budgets across NATO are rising, with Poland allocating 4% of GDP to military spending and France committing to a 40% increase by 2030. This shift prioritizes minerals critical to aerospace (titanium), semiconductors (tantalum), and advanced weaponry (rare earths).
Europe’s dependency is acute: 95% of its rare earths come from China, and 40% of its lithium is sourced from a single Chilean mine.
Rwanda, with untapped rare earth deposits and lithium reserves, could position itself as a strategic supplier to a continent desperate to diversify.
The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, which mandates that 10% of annual mineral consumption come from European recycling or African partners by 2030, creates a $100 billion opportunity.
Rwanda’s challenge is to move faster than competitors. Zimbabwe, home to Africa’s largest lithium reserves, banned raw exports in 2022 to force local refining.
The DRC, despite its instability, is finalizing deals with the UAE and EU to process cobalt. If Rwanda hesitates, it risks being relegated to the role of raw material exporter—a fate that has cursed its neighbors.
To avoid this, Rwanda must radically rethink extraction. Exporting raw ore is economic suicide. Take tantalum: Rwanda produced 1,200 tons in 2022, but exporting it as raw ore earned $190 million.
Refining it into capacitor-grade powder—a process Rwanda has begun piloting—could quadruple revenues to $760 million. Similarly, Rwanda already processes 60% of its tin domestically, but this must expand to lithium and rare earths.
Yet time is short. The supercycle’s window is narrow; since 1900, there have been only four. Rwanda’s youth, 60% plus of whom are under 25, cannot wait.
By 2030, the global lithium market will be worth $22 billion, rare earths $20 billion.
To claim a share, Rwanda must act now: fast-track processing plants, empower locals to invest in the mining sector, secure partnerships, and position ourself as a regional hub for mineral innovation.
The alternative—wasting this moment—would not just be a failure for Rwanda. It would reinforce the world’s cynical view that Africa cannot escape its resource curse. But Rwanda has defied expectations before. Its post-genocide rebirth, driven by gender equality and tech ambition, proves that progress is possible. The minerals beneath its soil are not just commodities; they are the foundation of a future where Rwanda’s youth thrive at home, building industries that outlast the boom. History judges not the wealth beneath our feet, but the wisdom with which we use it. The supercycle has begun. Rwanda’s moment is now.