As the great Russian historian Vasily Klyuchevsky said, “History is not a teacher but an overseer. It does not teach anyone; it merely punishes those who haven’t learnt their lessons.”
Therefore, it seems appropriate to review some chapters of our history ahead of the 80th anniversary of the Great Victory, particularly in the context of the current international and foreign policy realities.
The countries of the anti-Hitler coalition regularly discussed the post-war settlement of Europe almost from the beginning of the Great Patriotic War (1941−1945).
During a meeting with Soviet Ambassador in London Ivan Maisky on November 27, 1941, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill openly admitted that Prussia bore the brunt of responsibility for aggressive German militarism, and that in the future Bavaria, Austria, Wurttemberg, and others, must be liberated from Prussian oppression.
During his next meeting with the Soviet ambassador on December 5, 1941, Churchill elaborated that the main aim was to eradicate the German threat once and for all, requiring a complete disarmament of Germany for at least one generation and its division into several parts, primarily the secession of Prussia from the other German territories.
The first substantive discussion about Germany’s future was held with London during a working visit by Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, to Moscow on December 15−20, 1941.
The parties also talked about signing a secret protocol on the recognition of the Soviet Union’s 1941 borders, the division of Germany into several independent states, with East Prussia as one of them, and the annexation of part of Prussia, including Koenigsberg, to the Soviet Union as a guarantee of post-war reparations.
Joseph Stalin stated his views on the “post-war reorganisation of European borders,” saying that weakening Germany was a vital condition, primarily through the separation of the Rhine region with its industrial sector from the rest of Prussia. He also said that Austria should be restored as an independent state.
The British ruling circles were uncertain whether the Red Army could withstand the German onslaught. They doubted the Soviet Union’s military capability even after the Battle of Moscow.
This explains their open reluctance to share their plans and perspectives on the future, especially concerning the post-war settlement of Europe. Eden was not ready for a substantive exchange of views in Moscow.
He only said that the UK government supported Austria’s independence in any event and was willing to discuss the independence of Bavaria and the Rhine region.
At the same time, Anthony Eden admitted that Roosevelt and Churchill had held consultations on the post-war reconstruction of Europe even before Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union.
The Anglo-Saxons refused to recognise the Soviet Union as an equal party to the post-war settlement until 1943. However, the Allies’ interest in the future of Germany after its defeat in the war grew with every change on the Soviet-German front.
The Soviet Union, the United States and Britain had different goals in the war. The anti-Hitler coalition was formed and grew stronger because they needed to rout a common enemy. But their views on the post-war settlement differed significantly.
The issue was raised at US President Roosevelt’s meeting with Anthony Eden in March 1943. Soviet Ambassador in Washington Maxim Litvinov, who talked with his UK counterpart after his meeting with the US president, concluded that London and Washington were “unanimous… on the disarmament of the Axis powers and the breakdown of Germany… They propose recreating Czechoslovakia within its old borders and establishing a separate Austrian state… Eden does not think that the issue of our western border would meet with serious difficulties in the United States, and that Poland would be satisfied with getting East Prussia.”
Ambassador Maisky, who met with Eden on April 7 and 12, 1943, was of the same opinion: “They see as the best solution… the breakdown of Germany into several states… at least three German states… Austria must be an independent state.”
The Soviet Union improved its military standing further after defeating the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk. This led to a growing awareness in London and Washington that ignoring Soviet interests when making decisions that affected all Allies could be dangerous.
On October 9, 1943, Maxim Litvinov, in his capacity as the USSR’s Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, presented a report titled Treating Germany and Other Enemy Countries in Europe.
In it, he wrote that “there is a sense of solidarity among the three governments … on taking all the necessary measures to prevent any future German aggression.” Everyone agreed that “all territories acquired by Germany since Hitler’s arrival to power, both during the ongoing war, and in the pre-war period, must be viewed as not belonging to Germany.”
Therefore, “both Austria and the Sudetenland, which Germany took from Czechoslovakia, were not to be part of Germany.” At the same time, Litvinov quoted official statements by the UK on “liberating Austria from Germany’s yoke, as well as restoring Czechoslovakia in its pre-Munich borders… Germany’s borders as per the Treaty of Versailles may also be revised, primarily Germany’s border with Poland.”
Maxim Litvinov noted that the British wanted “East Prussia, Silesia, and of course the Danzig Corridor to become part of Poland. According to Eden, Roosevelt and his team also favoured transferring East Prussia to Poland as compensation for tracing its border along the so-called Curzon Line… But no matter East Prussia’s destiny… we have every right to demand that the Memel Territory be reunited with Lithuania, and the same goes for East Prussia… by tracing the line as suggested by our General Staff.”
The report went on to suggest “starting by taking care of partitioning present-day Prussia, which would retain its dominance over Germany even after losing East Prussia, Silesia and Schleswig”.
All the nuances raised during the subsequent talks with the Allies notwithstanding, the Soviet government largely adhered to this framework regarding the border issue in East Europe once the war was over.
On October 19−30, 1943, Moscow hosted a conference that brought together the Soviet, US and British foreign ministers. During this gathering, US Secretary of State Cordell Hull spoke out in favour of a decentralised political system for Germany and encouraging movements supporting this vision inside the country, including a movement “advocating reducing the Prussian influence on the Reich.”
Anthony Eden set forth the British cabinet’s vision in a plan for partitioning Germany into separate states… to separate Prussia from the rest of Germany, adding that the use of force should not be excluded when fulfilling these goals.
During the conference, the Americans noted that while they were inclined to accept the idea of splitting up Germany, they had yet to come to a final decision on this matter.
As for the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, he said that Moscow had yet to define its position on this topic and needed more time, as its leaders were too busy dealing with military matters at that time.
The participants in the conference approved the Declaration on Austria, saying that they wanted to re-establish a free and independent Austria, while declaring the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany in 1938 as null and void.
At the same time, the declaration acknowledged Austria’s responsibility for participating in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany and that “in the final settlement, account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.”
The outcomes of the Moscow Conference largely shaped the talks between the Big Three leaders in Tehran on November 28 – December 1, 1943. Once again, the Americans and the British took centre stage on the issue of partitioning Germany.
US President Franklin Roosevelt outlined his own plan, which proposed dividing Germany into five independent states. In addition to this, he suggested detaching several territories from Germany and placing them under the control of the United Nations, the four victorious powers or European trustees.
As for Winston Churchill, he suggested isolating Prussia from the rest of Germany and cutting off its southern states, i.e., Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg, and Palatinate (Pfalz) from Saarland to Saxony. He believed in creating a harsh environment for Prussia, while taking Germany’s southern states from it and incorporating them into the Confederation of the Danube.
It is worth noting that in July 1943, the British circulated a document among Allies regarding Austria’s future, all while nurturing plans to establish an East European confederation as a sanitary cordon and a counterweight to the Soviet Union.
The document offered four most likely solutions for resolving the Austrian issue, which were as follows: 1) uniting Austria with Germany as part of the Reich or as a federation, 2) including Austria in a South German confederation, 3) re-establishing Austria as a free and independent state, and 4) including Austria in a confederation of Central and East European countries.
The Americans did not support Churchill’s idea of creating groupings of states or confederations in Europe. The Soviet authorities did not approve of it either.
Moscow recognised that the main goal of these plans was to create anti-Soviet blocs. Consequently, Joseph Stalin spoke out against the establishment of such unsustainable entities and called for the independence of Austria and Hungary.
It should be noted that after the start of consultations on the post-war settlement in Europe, the future of East Prussia was discussed as part of the so-called Polish question.
The Soviet government pointed out on numerous occasions that the Polish people’s aspirations for reunification as a strong and independent state deserved recognition and support.
Moscow also believed that Poland’s borders should be determined with due regard for the security interests of Europe, and that Poland should be transformed from a source of conflicts and wars into a factor of stability and lasting peace.
During the Tehran Conference on December 1, 1943, Stalin explained that “the Ukrainian territories should be assigned to Ukraine, and the Byelorussian territories to Byelorussia.”
Likewise, the Soviet Union considered that it would be correct for Poland to regain control of its ancestral territories in the west. UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill proposed that “the home of the Polish state and nation should be between the so-called Curzon Line and the line of the Oder, including for Poland East Prussia and Oppeln.”
In the context of the Polish western border settlement, Stalin pointed out that the Soviet Union had no ice-free ports in the Baltic Sea and proposed considering the transfer of the ice-free ports of Koenigsberg and Memel, along with the adjacent parts of East Prussia, to the Soviet Union.
He added that the Soviet Union would accept Churchill’s proposals regarding Polish borders if Britain agreed to transfer these territories to the Soviet Union.
During a breakfast on November 30, 1943, Churchill confirmed that Russia should have access to ice-free ports and that Britain had no objections to that. Therefore, the transfer of Koenigsberg to the Soviet Union was tentatively agreed.
In 1944, the Red Army won a number of major victories over Germany and the Axis powers. The westward movement of the frontline and the growing might of the Soviet Union showed that the Red Army could potentially defeat Nazi Germany without the Allies’ assistance.
This led to a major change in their views on the future of Germany between the Tehran and Yalta conferences. The West began to act not only to defeat Germany but also to contain the Soviet Union.
According to a telegram sent by Soviet Ambassador Andrey Gromyko from Washington on October 6, 1944, the US Department of State was divided on the issue of post-war Germany.
However, American diplomats were inclined to think that Germany should be preserved as the leading industrial power in Europe to hinder the growth of the Soviet Union’s influence.
When the Yalta Conference was held in Crimea on February 4−11, 1945, the Red Army was barely 60 kilometres from Berlin. The Anglo-Saxon circles started thinking about forming a bloc of West European states after the war, with Germany as one of its members. This rendered the Anglo-Saxon plans for Germany’s de-industrialisation and division irrelevant.
On February 5, 1945, Stalin openly asked the Allies in Yalta if they supported the disintegration of Germany following its defeat. He reminded them that the US and British governments had voiced such plans twice, in Tehran in 1943 and during the Soviet-British talks in Moscow in October 1944.
The US and British leaders reaffirmed their principled stance on Germany’s disintegration. As a result, the Soviet Union supported the Allies’ idea of adding the following phrase to Article 12 of the declaration regarding the defeat of Germany: “In the exercise of the supreme authority with respect to Germany assumed by the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, …the… Allied Governments will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and dismemberment of Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace and security.”
The delegations also settled the Polish issue by pointing out that not all of East Prussia should be turned over to Poland, and that the northern part of that province with the ports of Memel and Koenigsberg should be transferred to the Soviet Union.
The Soviet and US delegates said that Poland should receive part of German territories as compensation, namely the part of East Prussia south of the Koenigsberg and Upper Silesia line to the Oder River.
Ultimately, it was decided that Poland’s eastern border would run along the Curzon Line, and that it would receive substantial territories in the north and the west, with their size to be coordinated with the new Provisional Government of National Unity. The final demarcation of Poland’s western border was postponed until the peace conference.
The compromise decisions regarding the Polish issue and parts of East Prussia, which the Allies adopted in Yalta, amounted to a diplomatic victory for the Soviet Union, as they were objectively in the interests of the Polish people.
Poland’s new borders were ideal in terms of security. Moreover, it exchanged economically backward agricultural regions in the east for industrialised regions and Baltic ports in the west.
It is important that we recognised the lack of sincerity in all these Anglo-Saxon declarations outlining abstract plans for partitioning Germany. In the run-up to the Yalta Conference, the intention to use the future German state in any shape or form as a post-war containment tool against the USSR crystallised in the West, while the Soviet government could see through these plans and acted accordingly.
The outcomes of the Yalta Conference included the decision to set up a new commission with the mission of defining Germany’s future. Within its framework, Great Britain tabled a proposal for the Allies to draft a joint plan of action.
The Soviet delegates responded by sending a letter to the commission’s chair, Anthony Eden, saying that the USSR viewed the Yalta Conference’s resolution on planning Germany’s partition as “one of the eventualities for pressuring Germany and neutralising it in case other means prove to be insufficient,” rather than an imperative.
In a wire message dated March 24, 1945, Vyacheslav Molotov wrote to the Soviet Ambassador in London, Fyodor Gusev, that “the British and the Americans were the first to put Germany’s partition on the agenda, but are now seeking to shift the responsibility for doing this onto the USSR in order to disparage our state in the eyes of international public opinion. We must submit the proposal as mentioned above in order to deprive them of this possibility.” A letter from the Soviet government was enough to remove Germany’s partition from the commission’s agenda.
The USSR also set forth its position on this matter in Joseph Stalin’s Victory Speech on May 9, 1945, when the Soviet leader said: “The Soviet Union is celebrating Victory, although it does not intend either to dismember or to destroy Germany.”
There is no mention of any possible partition of Germany in the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany of June 5, 1945, as signed by the four allied commanders in chief in Berlin, while the arrangements resulting from the Potsdam Conference referred to Germany as a single economic entity.
In fact, held from July 17 to August 2, 1945, the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference became the last stage in the joint effort by the heads of the anti-Hitler coalition. It took intense and hard-fought negotiations for the Soviet delegation to make its case on Poland’s western borders.
Having failed to establish a government in Poland as they deemed fit, the British and the Americans were not interested in making this country stronger or giving it more land. Nevertheless, the USSR prevailed.
On August 1, 1945, the Potsdam Conference issued a protocol of its proceedings, followed on August 2, 1945, by a Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin. These documents contained a section titled City of Koenigsberg and the Adjacent Area, which read:
The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government to the effect that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.
The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.
The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.
These documents also contained the following wording: “The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinamunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.”
The Potsdam Conference’s biggest achievements centred on its resolutions on the German issue. In fact, they recognised the German state within its new borders as a single economic and political entity, despite serious disagreements on matters dealing with the restoration of a centralised governance framework.
Germany was divided into four occupation zones immediately after the war ended. Under the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany, the governments of the United Kingdom, the USSR, the United States and France were to assume supreme authority over Germany, each operating within its own occupation zone. Berlin was also divided into four sectors, with an Allied Kommandatura formed by the four powers to govern the city.
Moreover, the United States, Britain and France initially recognised that the Soviet military administration in Germany would exercise supreme authority over the German capital as the centre of the Soviet occupation zone.
However, the creation of occupation zones in Germany did not entail its partition or dismemberment, even if it served as a precursor to such an outcome. In fact, the Allied Control Council failed to endure as a unified governance mechanism.
Two centres of gravity emerged with the Western military administrations of the occupied zone on the one hand, and the Soviet zone, on the other.
The allies failed to coordinate the political, legal, economic and social initiatives in their respective zones, which effectively resulted in the gradual emergence of two German state entities with opposing agendas. In other words, the former Allies abandoned their plans to establish a single German state in the foreseeable future.
The Western occupation authorities, which initially operated autonomously, essentially merged into a single administrative system. Amid the Cold War, which began to manifest itself in the first post-war years, they sought to preserve Germany’s defence capabilities.
In violation of earlier agreements, Western countries did not dismantle German military industries or de-monopolise the market. Neither did they disband all army units; many units remained combat-ready.
Gradually, the occupation zones administered by the UK, US and France were merged into one territory, and parliamentary elections were held there on August 14, 1949, contrary to the initial agreements reached by the Allies. On September 20, 1949, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany was formed.

The emergence of the Federal Republic of Germany changed the situation dramatically. In response, on October 7, 1949, the German People’s Council, with the Soviet authorities’ approval, proclaimed the creation of the German Democratic Republic and assumed the duties of parliament. As a result, two German states were established in place of the defeated Nazi Germany.
Berlin, also divided into four sectors after the war, ended up split into two parts. The American, British and French sectors formed an independent political entity, West Berlin, where the direct rule of the Western occupation authorities was legally preserved. The Soviet sector became the capital of the GDR.
This created a unique situation in Europe, where a country was divided into two states with opposing socio-political systems.
In response to two American initiatives – the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan – the USSR moved to strengthen its bonds with Eastern European states. International relations fully entered the Cold War phase. Instead of becoming a bridge between East and West, Germany turned into an arena for major confrontation between the two systems.
Austria followed a different scenario. On April 9, 1945, the USSR, guided by the above-mentioned October 30, 1943 Moscow declaration on Austria’s independence signed by the Allies, issued a statement asserting that the Soviet government was not seeking to possess any part of Austrian territory or change the social system in that country, and stating its intention to facilitate the liquidation of the Nazi occupation regime and the restoration of democratic orders and institutions in Austria.
The priorities of Soviet policy towards Austria were its separation from Germany and the creation of reliable barriers to a new Anschluss in any form.
The July 4, 1945, agreement between the governments of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain and the Provisional Government of France on the Allied Control Machinery in Austria paved the way for the establishment of the Allied Commission on Austria, consisting of representatives of the four states.
The commission was tasked with finally separating Austria from Germany, creating a central administrative system and ensuring the free election of an Austrian government.
The July 9, 1945, agreement on the occupation zones in Austria and the administration of the city of Vienna stipulated that the country, within its 1937 borders, was divided into four occupation zones, each assigned to the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and the Provisional Government of France. Vienna was collectively occupied by the armed forces of the four powers, and the city was to be administered by an inter-allied governing authority.
The Parties to the Soviet-Austrian talks held in Moscow on April 12−15, 1955, reached an agreement on the most important issues related to the draft State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria.
The Moscow Memorandum contained Austria’s commitment to refrain from joining any military alliances, to disallow the construction of military bases on its territory, and to conduct an independent foreign policy.

The Austrian Party stressed that Vienna would make a relevant statement on its permanent neutrality in a form that imposed an international obligation upon the Republic.
In April and May, 1955, the Soviet Government took steps to coordinate the draft treaty with the Allies. As a result, the four powers agreed to delete an article concerning the numerical restrictions to be imposed on the Austrian armed forces.
Previously challenged by the Western participants, certain fundamental provisions (on disbanding the Nazi organisations, on the UN property, etc.) were endorsed in the wording originally proposed by the Soviet Union.
They also granted Vienna’s request to remove a paragraph containing a direct mention of Austria’s responsibility for participating in the war from the treaty preamble.
The foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, and France did not object to Austria following a course of neutrality, as indicated in the Soviet-Austrian memorandum.
The State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria was signed on May 15, 1955, and came into force on July 27, 1955.
Under the Treaty and the Soviet-Austrian agreement of April 15, 1955, the USSR handed over to Austria, in August 1955, more than 400 Soviet-owned German businesses, industrial plants, oil fields, shipyards, and storage facilities, located in eastern Austria. The Soviet troop pullout was finalised by September 20, 1955. The United States, Britain, and France withdrew their armed forces as well, thereby putting an end to the country’s occupation.
Austria, for its part, passed a law on its permanent neutrality on October 26, 1955. On December 6, 1955, in response to Vienna’s request, the governments of the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France acknowledged their recognition of Austria’s permanent neutrality as defined by the law.
This completed the process of re-establishing the Austrian state’s sovereignty and independence within its January 1, 1938 borders.
The post-war settlement in Europe, with the resolution of the German and Austrian issues as its important, if not crucial, part, was an example of the successful harmonisation of state interests based on mutual respect and goodwill. However, not all objectives were achieved.
On January 25, 2023, President of Russia Vladimir Putin addressed university students on the Russian Students Day, saying that “…the Soviet Union, and Russia as the legal successor of the Soviet Union, acted as the guarantor of the constitution of the Republic of Austria and the guarantor of the neutral status of the Republic of Austria.”
He also reminded his audience that the USSR “legally formalised the end of the occupation” of the Federal Republic of Germany: “After all, after the Second World War, Germany was, as you know, divided into four occupation zones: American, British, French and Soviet. So, the Soviet Union legally ended the occupation, but the United States did not. Strictly speaking – technically, legally – there are American occupation troops in the Federal Republic of Germany. In fact, they are: there are a lot of them.
“Even German politicians say that Germany has not been a sovereign state in the full sense of the word since WWII. It is not me saying this; it is prominent and, more importantly, not pro-Russian but pro-German people saying this. They have been saying this openly. In other words, there are very deep roots and serious reasons for everything that is taking place now.”
The present is undoubtedly rooted in the past, and the events unfolding in the world today always have their causes and historical foundations.
Today, we have reached a divide where another restructuring of the international order and its adaptation to the multipolar geopolitical realities is on the agenda. It is crucial, therefore, to draw the right lessons, while the post-war settlement of the German and Austrian issues provides a wealth of valuable factual material for this endeavour.
Author is Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
Article was published in the Bulletin of the Security Council of the Russian Federation No. 3 (91), 2024